Consciousness remains one of the most profound mysteries in science and philosophy. While numerous theories attempt to explain its origins, Integrated Information Theory (IIT) provides a compelling framework for understanding how subjective experiences arise from neural processes. Mental imagery—our ability to visualize, hear, feel, or even conceptualize without direct sensory input—plays a crucial role in shaping conscious experience. But how do these two ideas connect? Can IIT help explain the different types and levels of mental imagery? Moreover, could alternative forms of mental imagery, such as emotional or conceptual thought, contribute to consciousness as vividly as sensory-based imagery?

This article explores the relationship between IIT and mental imagery, examining how different imagery systems contribute to consciousness through varying degrees of information integration. My grasp of these wider ideas comes intuitively, shaped by personal experience rather than empirical research. While these connections may be difficult to prove at this stage, documenting them provides a basis for discussion and inquiry.

What is Integrated Information Theory (IIT)?

Integrated Information Theory (IIT) is a theoretical framework developed to explain the nature of consciousness. Proposed by Giulio Tononi in 2004, IIT suggests that consciousness arises from the ability of a system to integrate information. It introduces a key measure, Φ (phi), which quantifies the amount of integrated information in a system. The higher the Φ, the richer the conscious experience.

Core Principles of IIT

IIT is built on several key principles:

1. Intrinsic Existence: Consciousness exists from the system’s own perspective, not just as an external observation.

2. Composition: Experiences are structured, made up of distinct components.

3. Information: A conscious experience is specific, differing from other possible experiences.

4. Integration: Information must be unified rather than fragmented across independent parts.

5. Exclusion: A system has a singular experience at any given time, excluding other potential experiences.

   
   

What Does IIT Mean for Research?

IIT has significant implications for neuroscience, artificial intelligence, and the study of mental disorders. Researchers use IIT to:

• Identify neural correlates of consciousness (e.g., which brain regions contribute most to experience).

• Understand conditions like coma, sleep, and anesthesia, where Φ levels decrease.

• Explore the potential for consciousness in artificial systems by evaluating their information integration.

Integrating IIT with Mental Imagery and Its Levels

The Mental Imagery Resistance (MIR) language framework for mental imagery systems and their levels aligns well with IIT, as both explore the nature of subjective experience. Mental imagery involves different sensory modalities (visual, auditory, tactile, etc.), each potentially contributing to consciousness through varying degrees of information integration.

Mental imagery serves as a critical cognitive function that enables individuals to simulate experiences without direct sensory input. The richness and vividness of these experiences vary from person to person, and from modality to modality, raising the question of how different types of imagery contribute to conscious awareness. IIT provides a useful framework to understand this phenomenon by proposing that mental experiences are not merely the activation of individual sensory regions but emerge from the integration of information across these systems.

For example, visual imagery—the ability to create mental pictures—relies on interactions between the visual cortex, associative areas, and higher-order processing networks. When an individual imagines a familiar face, multiple neural subsystems collaborate to recreate the perceptual experience, leading to a high level of integration and a corresponding increase in Φ. Similarly, auditory imagery, such as replaying a song in one’s mind, requires the cooperation of auditory processing regions, memory networks, and timing mechanisms, demonstrating another form of integrated experience.

However, some individuals may experience aphantasia across the five core senses while exhibiting hyperphantasia in non-sensory forms of imagery, such as emotional or conceptual thought. This suggests that conscious experience can still be highly integrated but structured differently—not through traditional sensory modalities but through internally generated sensations tied to emotions, abstract reasoning, or memory recall. If emotional states function as a kind of hormonal memory, influenced by both internal states and environmental signals, then the brain's ability to process and integrate these experiences may still contribute to high Φ values, just in a different domain.

The Hypothesis of Emotional Imagery

Research in The Cambridge Handbook of the Imagination (Blackwell, 2020) suggests that emotional mental imagery plays a fundamental role in decision-making, planning, and anticipating future events. This supports the idea that emotional and conceptual thought are deeply integrated cognitive processes, potentially reaching high Φ values within IIT’s framework.

Further supporting this, Ji et al. (2016) describe emotional mental imagery as a simulation of reality, capable of evoking physiological and subjective emotional responses. Their research demonstrates that emotional imagery is not merely a passive reflection of past experiences but an active process capable of influencing neural activity and behaviour. This aligns with the hypothesis that hormonal states influence emotional imagery, forming a neurobiological basis for non-sensory mental integration.

Building on this, bioinformational theory (Lang, 1979) proposes that emotional mental imagery activates an associative memory network that includes sensory, semantic, and response-related information. This suggests that emotional and conceptual imagery should be considered highly integrated processes within IIT, reaching Φ values comparable to or exceeding those of traditional sensory-based imagery.

The MIR framework introduces the concept of hormonal memory, which refers to the way hormones such as cortisol and oxytocin modulate the encoding and retrieval of emotional experiences. For example, cortisol enhances the consolidation of emotionally charged memories, while oxytocin facilitates the recall of positive social interactions. This creates a feedback loop where emotional states are not only stored as memories but also re-experienced through imagery. In this way, hormonal memory serves as a bridge between physiological states and conscious experience, contributing to the integration of emotional information in the brain.

This expands the idea of mental imagery beyond purely sensory experiences. Instead, meaning itself may manifest as an internally perceived sensation, making emotional and abstract thought as perceptually real to some individuals as visual or auditory imagery is to others. This suggests that IIT should not focus solely on sensory-based information integration but also account for deep interoceptive and conceptual processing as valid contributors to conscious experience.

Different Imagery Systems and Consciousness

According to IIT, not all mental processes contribute equally to consciousness. Similarly, different mental imagery systems may have varying degrees of integration:

• Visual imagery (e.g., picturing a sunset) may involve highly integrated cortical networks, leading to a high Φ value.

• Auditory imagery (e.g., imagining a song) engages separate but connected neural circuits.

• Tactile or spatial imagery may operate at a lower Φ, contributing less directly to conscious experience.

• Emotional and conceptual imagery, particularly in those with aphantasia for sensory modalities, may be highly integrated through hormonal memory and abstract cognition, contributing significantly to overall consciousness.

Hierarchy of Mental Imagery and Φ Levels

Integrated Information Theory (IIT) provides a valuable framework for understanding the different levels of mental imagery, ranging from simple sensory fragments to fully immersive multisensory simulations. While IIT is often discussed in relation to sensory experiences, its principles extend to non-sensory forms of imagery, such as emotional, conceptual, and memory-based thought. These forms of imagery engage extensive neural networks and contribute to consciousness just as richly as sensory-based imagery. In fact, emotional, conceptual, and memory-driven imagery can integrate vast amounts of information across multiple brain regions, potentially reaching Φ levels as high as—or even surpassing—those associated with traditional sensory imagery.

Supporting this perspective, research on bioinformational theory suggests that narrative-driven emotional imagery activates widespread neural regions, including motor areas and episodic memory systems (Lang, 1979). This reinforces the view that emotional and conceptual imagery should be regarded as highly integrated processes within IIT, with Φ values comparable to, or even exceeding, those of traditional sensory-based imagery.

The different levels of mental imagery—ranging from basic sensory fragments to fully integrated multisensory simulations—can therefore be effectively understood through the lens of IIT:

• Low-Φ Imagery: Basic, isolated representations that involve minimal information integration. This could be a single color, a faint sound, or an isolated thought with little connectivity to other concepts or emotions.

• Mid-Φ Imagery: More structured experiences requiring moderate integration. This can include sensory images (e.g., recalling a face or melody) or conceptual constructs (e.g., mentally simulating a logical argument or recalling an emotional memory with some intensity).

• High-Φ Imagery: Fully immersive experiences with extensive information integration. This includes multisensory imagery (e.g., lucid dreaming, vivid daydreams) and deeply integrated non-sensory imagery, such as emotionally rich memories, abstract problem-solving, or the internal "feeling" of complex ideas. High-Φ states are not exclusive to sensory modalities; non-sensory forms of imagery can be just as deeply interconnected across brain networks, leading to equally rich conscious experiences.

Implications for Consciousness Studies

If IIT is correct, the strength and clarity of mental imagery might be correlated with higher Φ values. People with hyperphantasia (very vivid imagery) may have stronger information integration, while those with aphantasia (lack of imagery) may have lower Φ in imagery-related networks—unless they compensate with alternative forms of integrated thought, such as emotional or conceptual imagery. Multisensory imagery and conceptual-emotional integration may create a synergistic increase in Φ, enhancing conscious experience.

Empirical Predictions

To test this idea, researchers could conduct a neuroimaging study comparing individuals with high and low emotional imagery vividness. Participants would be exposed to emotionally charged stimuli while their hormonal levels are measured. Functional MRI (fMRI) could then assess neural activity in regions associated with emotional processing and information integration. According to my framework, individuals with higher hormonal reactivity should exhibit stronger emotional imagery and higher Φ values, reflecting greater information integration.

Practical Applications

This framework has important implications for mental health. For example, individuals with PTSD often experience intrusive emotional imagery related to traumatic events. By modulating hormonal levels (e.g., using oxytocin to reduce stress), clinicians could potentially alter the vividness of these intrusive images. Similarly, enhancing emotional imagery through hormonal interventions could benefit individuals with aphantasia, helping them access richer internal experiences.

Addressing Counterarguments

A potential criticism is that hormonal memory is not yet fully understood. While there is evidence that hormones influence memory and emotional states, the exact mechanisms by which they contribute to information integration remain unclear. Future research should aim to clarify these mechanisms and explore whether hormonal memory operates differently in individuals with varying levels of imagery vividness.

Summary

By integrating IIT and mental imagery theory, we have a framework for understanding how subjective experiences arise from neural structures. The MIR's focus on non-sensory imagery, such as emotional imagery— potentially based on hormonal memory—and individual differences like aphantasia and hyperphantasia offers new directions for consciousness research.

Future studies could explore how different types of imagery contribute to Φ levels, whether enhancing integration could improve cognitive or imaginative abilities, and how hormonal interventions might modulate emotional imagery in clinical settings. This perspective bridges fundamental neuroscience with subjective phenomenology, offering exciting possibilities for both theory and application.

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